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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
three provided for in the federal court system.3 These include
representation by private attorneys, attorneys furnished by the bar,
or a system containing a combination of both of these. Of course,
these solutions would only provide attorneys, not their fees. No one
solution appears to be better than others. Whatever the source or
funding for the adopted plan, it must be remembered that the right
of the individual to adequately defend himself against a possible loss
of liberty " . . . is too sacred a right to be sacrificed on the altar of
expedience."34
John Charles Lobert
Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualification of Specialist
as Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice
P, experiencing vision loss in his right eye, consulted D, an oph-
thalmologist. D informed P that he had a cataract formation on the
eye and advised a corrective operation, which was performed in
August of 1962. After the operation P made periodic visits to the
office of D where he was told each time that his progress was normal.
Though D continually assured P that he would recover his vision, P
continued to suffer from vision loss in his right eye. Finally, in
May, 1963, D told P that he had retina trouble in the right eye
and that he could do nothing to improve his vision. Subsequently, in
February, 1965, P, having trouble with his left eye, went to X, a
different specialist. X performed a cataract operation on the left
eye in March, 1965, and informed P that more than half of the iris
of the right eye was missing and that his eye was permanently
damaged. In May, 1965, P brought a malpractice action in the
Court of Common Pleas in Kanawha County, West Virginia. Part
of P's evidence was the expert testimony by deposition of Z, an
ophtalmologist from New York. After P rested his case D moved for
and obtained a directed verdict on the grounds that the cause of
action was barred by the pertinent statute of limitations. P appealed
and the circuit court reversed; but D was sustained on his cross
assignment of error, the circuit court holding the testimony of Z
inadmissible. The case was remanded for retrial, but P appealed.
Held the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded.
33 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(a) (1964).
34 State v. Borst, 154 N.W. 2d 888, 895 (Minn. 1967) (dictum).
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Z's expert testimony was held admissible. In liberalizing to a limited
degree the prior "locality rule," the court ruled that Z, the New
York specialist, was qualified to testify as to the correct manner to
perform a cataract operation, because the standard procedure was
shown to be the same throughout the country and thus applicable
to Charleston, West Virginia. Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159
(W. Va. 1967).
Medical malpractice is a subject about which the layman is greatly
unfamiliar and thus is not qualified to give medical opinions.' Hence,
expert medical witnesses are required in order for plaintiff to
produce the medical testimony to support his complaint.2 Because
of the uniqueness of the medical profession, it is allowed to set its
own standard of care.3 The three traditional standards for the
degree of care which a physician must meet are (1) the reasonable
degree of care and skill exercised by members of the profession
in good standing, (2) the school or system of practice which the
doctor follows, and (3) the locality in which the doctor practices.4
From this, the area from which an expert witness can be drawn
is defined. The Hundley case illustrates a broader definition of
"locality" by holding that, when a specialist qualifies as an expert
witness by being from the "same or similar locality" as the defendant,
the definition of locality is very inclusive, possibly the whole country.
Historically, the locality rule was based on the idea that a country
doctor was not to be held to possess the same medical knowledge
and thus not held to the same standard of care as the doctor in the
city. The reasons where that he did not have access to the facilities
in a large city, he usually would not practice a speciality, and he
would not come in constant contact with others of their profession,
resulting in little exchange of knowledge between country doctors.
It was thus stated that a physician or surgeon could be held to no
higher standard than others in the same locality.' However, with the
This is true except where the negligence is so great as to be obvious
to the layman, as illustrated in Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176
S.E. 603 (1934), and Howell v. Biggart, 108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930).
2 Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 9164); Schroeder v. Adkins,
149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
3 1 LAwYERs MEmicxAL CyCLoPEDIA § 2.46 (rev. ed. 1966).
4 Id. at § 2.41.
5 Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880). The early
rule in West Virginia was expressed in terms of a limited locality. "The physi-
cian is bound to bestow such reasonable, ordinary care, skill, and diligence
as physicians and surgeons in the same neighborhood, in the same general
line of practice, ordinarily have and exercise in like cases." Lawson v. Con-
way, 37 W. Va. 159, 168, 16 S.E. 564, 567 (1892).
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advancements which has taken place across the nation in the areas
of communication and transportation, the reasons behind the strict
rule have been weakened. The increasing number and excellence
of medical schools, the accumulation and publication of scientific
information, and the awareness of ethical standards have all com-
bined to harmonize medical standards throughout the country.6
Thus the phrase "same or similar locality" may no longer be confined
to the strict interpretation of a confined physical area 7
For many years the leading case on the "locality" rule in West
Virginia has been Dye v. Corbin,8 which held that a physician "is
required to exercise such reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence
as are ordinarily possessed and exercised by the average of the
members of the profession, in good standing, in similar locali-
ties. . . ."' Two recent West Virginia cases,' although not cited in
the opinion of the principal case, appear to have been moving in
the same direction as the principal case. One case, although not
based on the medical malpractice of a physician but on the negli-
gence of nurses in a hospital, held it would have been proper to admit
testimony from a New York doctor because the standards of care for
hospitals are the same." The second case held it would have been
proper to admit testimony of a surgeon from Cincinnati in a mal-
6 Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App.2d 247, 270, 288 P.2d 1003, 1071 (1955).
In Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34, 39 (Fla. 1956), the court recognized
by dictum the qualification of a doctor from Chicago, Illinois, to testify in
Orlando, Florida, when the act would not have been acceptable medical
practice in any community. The Florida decision was approved in Cook v.
Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1962).
7 This proposition appears to be the trend. In a case similar to the prin-
cipal case, Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), an expert from
California was permitted to testify in Utah because he was familar with the
procedure used for putting on a cast which was found to be universal through-
out the United States. The California court in Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App.
2d 247, 271, 288 P.2d 1003, 1018 (1955), conceded that the expert must
have knowledge of the standard of care where the negligent act was performed,
but held "community" or 'locality" means an area unified by the same
customs, laws, and sovereignty. In Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 573,
574, 162 A. 33, 36 (1932), it was held that there is now less reason than
previously that the territorial limitation should be limited to the confines of
a town or city in which treatment was rendered; that within the state medi-
cal practices are substantially the same. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 772 (1949);
5A PERSONAL INJUY-AcrIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES PHYsCLs & SURGEONS
§1.01 (1) (e) (M. Bender 1967).
8 59 W. Va. 266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906).
9 Id at 270, 53 S.E. at 149.
,0 Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 41 S.E.2d 352 (1965); Duling
v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965).
"1 Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W.Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754
(1965) See aiso Comment, EXPERT TESTimONY OF DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN
WHEN CALLED AS ADVERSE WrnTss, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 202 (1967).
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practice action against a chiropodist in Cabell County because he
would have been equally knowledgeable about the particular conduct
involved."
The standard of care for a specialist13 in his field is higher than
that of a general practitioner because he has additional education
and experience in his more defined field of practice. A specialist
is held to exercise that degree of skill and care ordinarily used by
similar specialists in like circumstances, having regard to the existing
state of knowledge in medicine and surgery. 4 A duty of a specialist
to keep abreast of the times is an important contribution to the en-
largement of the definition of the term "locality."'" Since the defini-
tion of a specialist's standard of care encompasses more than just a
particular locality, there is a much greater area from which an expert
may be brought to testify concerning medical malpractice of a
specialist.
Actually there should be very little difference throughout the
United States for the standard of care required of a specialist in a
certain field of medicine.' 6 In the principal case the expert on
ophthalmology testified that the standard way of performing the
cataract operation was the same throughout the country."7 More
particularly, the manner in which the defendant described the opera-
tion was the same procedure outlined by the expert. 8
Therefore, it would seem that, for a specialist in a malpractice
action, the "community" or "locality" in which he practices is very
large, possibly the entire country. Or, from another point of view,
12 Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
" The test to determine whether one is a specialist or general practitioner
is that one who holds himself out as a specialist is judged as a specialist.
Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951); Rule v. Chessman, 181
Kan. 957, 965, 317 P.2d 472, 478 (1958).
'4 Grossjean v. Spencer, 140 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Iowa 1966); McGulpin
v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1132, 43 N.W.2d 121, 128 (1950); Wood v.
Vroman, 215 Mich. 449, 465-66, 184 N.W. 520, 525 (1921); Carbone v.
Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 426, 94 A.2d 680, 683 (1953); 41 Am. JuR. PHYsI-
CIANS & SURGEONS § 90 (1942); 7 AM. Jur. PROOF oF Fars, Malpractice 79
(Supp. 1967).
,5 In Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 236, 118 P.2d
707, 714 (1941) the court said, "Physicians are required to keep abreast of
and use best modem methods of treatment, and in so doing they may not un-
duly and narrowly restrict or confine their responsibility to the immediate place
where they are practicing." Accord, Worster v. Cayler, 231 Ind. 625, 630,
110 N.E. 2d 337, 339 (1953); Stone v. Goodman 271 N.Y.S. 500 507 (1934).
16 Although no case was found directly on tis point, it would seem to be
the logical continuance of the present trend.
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it could be said that for the specialist the locality rule has been
abandoned. The principal case would appear to support this obser-
vation. Yet, the court was careful not to abrogate the locality
rule entirely. Each case must be considered on its own facts. The
court seemed to say that the locality rule applies to specialists and
general practitioners, but the definition of locality for the specialist
embraces more area." The diminishing importance of the locality
rule can be seen by one expressed view that the size and character
of the community is just one factor to be taken into account in
determining the applicable general professional standard."
The general rule as to the standard of care established for a doctor
in a medical malpractice action, imposing the requirements of the
same or similar locality, still prevails. However, with improved
communications and transportation, the area of inclusion within
a "locality" has been enlarged. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals seems fully warranted in holding that the locality to which
the standard is applied for a specialist in a medical malpractice action
in West Virginia is large enough to encompass the testimony of a
specialist from New York.
Richard Edwin Rowe
Future Interests--Transmissibility and Survivorship
Characteristics of Reminders
T died in 1908, leaving a will which devised her property to X
in trust for the benefit of A for life, and in case A should die leaving
"child or children" surviving her then to such "child or children." If
A should died without issue then to T's brothers and sisters in equal
shares, with the share of any brother or sister who died leaving
children to those children. T had eight brothers and sisters, three
of whom predeceased T, and the remaining five predeceased A,
who died without issue in 1965. The trial court found that T intended
her property to go to her brothers and sisters or their direct des-
cendents per stirpes, without lapse, with the interests vesting at
19 This is not to say that the locality rule for the general practitioner
has not been expanded, but only that the expansion for the specialist has
been greater.
20 McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1131, 43 N.W.2d 121, 128
(1950); W. PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 (3d ed. 1984).
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